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RECENT DECISIONS
CORPORATION LAW-SHAREHOLDERS'

DERIVATIVE

ACTIONS-SPECIAL LITIGATION COMMITTEES-

BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE-The Supreme Court of

North Carolina, withdrawing its prior decision, held

that North Carolina courts cannot passively accept a
recommendation to terminate shareholder litigation
when made by a special litigation committee
appointed by defendant directors, but must make an
independent inquiry into the merits of the
recommendation to determine whether the
defendants have met their summary judgment burden
of proof.
Alford v. Shaw, 320 N.C. 465, 358 S.E.2d 323 (1987), rev'g, 318
N.C. 289, 349 S.E.2d 41 (1986).
On November 4, 1975, the All American Assurance Company
was placed into involuntary rehabilitation by the North Carolina
Department of Insurance 2 pursuant to allegations of mismanagement'

1. At this time, All American was incorporated and headquartered in North
Carolina, but had its principal offices in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. It was formed
in 1972 when Pyramid Life Insurance Company, which was also incorporated and
headquartered in North Carolina, merged with All American Assurance Company,
a Louisiana corporation. Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C. App. 77, 82, 250 S.E.2d
279, 284 (1978), disc. rev. denied and appeal dismissed, 296 N.C. 740, 254 S.E.2d
181 (1979). Swenson v. Thibaut was a minority shareholders' derivative action
involving many of the same facts, parties and counsel as Alford v. Shaw, 320 N.C.
465, 358 S.E.2d 323 (1987), rev'g, 318 N.C. 289, 349 S.E.2d 41 (1986). Norman V.

Swenson was the former president of Pyramid Insurance Company. 39 N.C. App.
at 86, 250 S.E.2d at 286. In 1975, Charest D. Thibaut, Jr. was a director of both
Republic Securities Corporation (see infra note 3) and All American Assurance
Company, and was a substantial shareholder of each. Id. at 83 n.1, 250 S.E.2d at
284 n. 1.
2. 39 N.C. App. at 84-85, 250 S.E.2d at 285.
3. Id. at 82-84, 250 S.E.2d at 284-85. When the events which were set forth
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and for the protection of shareholders' interests. 4 Under the terms
of the rehabilitation, sixty-five percent of All American's shares were
transferred to American Bank and Trust Company,' in exchange for
which American Bank and Trust agreed to maintain the solvency of
All American through December 31, 1976.6 All American was released
from rehabilitation on May 7, 1976, 7 subject to several conditions,
including a requirement that the corporation vigorously prosecute
claims against parties responsible for it being subjected to rehabilitation. 8
On October 20, 1976, at an All American substitute annual shareholders' meeting, 9 certain minority shareholders introduced a resoin the complaint occurred, the ownership and control of All American and Republic
Securities, a Louisiana corporation, were substantially identical. All American was
solvent, but 64% of its capital stock was owned by the essentially insolvent Republic
Securities Corporation. The plaintiffs alleged that, as a result of self-dealing and
negligent acquiescence by the defendants, All American's assets had been "looted"
for the benefit of Republic Securities and other enterprises controlled by the
defendants. Id.
4. Id. at 85, 250 S.E.2d at 285.
5. Id. American Bank and Trust Company was foreclosing on a debt owed
to it by Republic Securities when Republic transferred 1,011,610 shares of All
American's capital stock (65% of the total outstanding) to American Bank and
Trust. Id.
6.
7.

Id.
Id.

8. Id. at 85, 250 S.E.2d at 285-86.
9. Id. All American had originally scheduled its substitute annual shareholders' meeting for July 21, 1976, for the purpose of electing directors following
the corporation's release from rehabilitation. On July 19, 1976, Norman Swenson
filed a petition requesting that All American be restrained from holding the meeting.
Swenson v. All American Assurance Co., 33 N.C. App. 458, 458, 235 S.E.2d 793,
793 (1977). Swenson claimed he had been wrongfully denied the opportunity,
sufficiently in advance of the meeting, to copy names of shareholders from corporate
records. Consequently, he was unable to solicit proxy votes for the purpose of
obtaining representation on the board of directors. Id. at 458-59, 235 S.E.2d at
794. It was alleged that All American had sustained a net loss of $6,320,000 during
1975 as a result of decisions made by directors proposed for renomination and
election to the board. Id. at 458, 235 S.E.2d at 793. The trial court issued a
temporary restraining order. Id. at 459, 235 S.E.2d at 794. Then, on July 29, 1976,
the court ordered the substitute annual shareholders' meeting be held on September
15, 1976. Furthermore, All American was directed to provide shareholders, prior to
the meeting, an adequate opportunity to inspect the corporation's record of shareholders. Id. at 461, 235 S.E.2d at 795 (opinion of the trial court is unreported). All
American appealed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated the order and
reversed the decision of the trial court for lack of jurisdiction because Swenson had
failed to issue and serve summons upon All American as required by North Carolina
law. Id. at 461-65, 235 S.E.2d at 795-97. Judge Morris wrote the opinion of the
court, id. at 461, 235 S.E.2d at 795, with Judges Parker and Clark concurring, id.
at 465, 235 S.E.2d at 797. See infra note 21 for additional information on Judge
Parker.
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lution demanding that the board of directors seek reimbursement
from those responsible for the losses which led to the involuntary
rehabilitation of the company.' 0 This resolution was defeated by the
representatives of the majority shareholders," which ultimately resulted, on December 30, 1976, in the minority shareholders bringing
a derivative action 12 on behalf of All American to recover the alleged
losses. "3
American Bank and Trust sold its sixty-five percent of All American's outstanding stock to American Commonwealth Financial Corporation on January 5, 1979.14 Subsequent activities by All American
resulted in claims of impropriety and mismanagement being asserted
against corporate officers and directors.' 5 These allegations were set

10. Swenson v. Thibaut, 39-N.C. App. 77, 86, 250 S.E.2d 279, 286 (1978).
11. Id. 67,316 votes were cast for the resolution and 1,274,769 against, with
the defendants all voting against. Id.
12. A shareholders' derivative suit is an equitable action which allows shareholders to assert a corporation's cause of action on behalf of the corporation. The
action is usually brought against directors or managers for wrongdoing which resulted
in harm to the corporation by their acts alone, or for their failure to pursue claims
of wrongdoing against third-parties. See, e.g., N. Lattin, The Law of Corporations,
§ 103 (2d ed. 1971); Brown, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and the Special
Litigation Committee, 43 U. Prrr. L. REv. 601, 601-06 (1982) [hereinafter Brown];
Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on its Derivation, 32 N.Y. U. L.
REv. 980 (1957) [hereinafter Prunty]. See infra notes 104-24, 202-18, 233-37 and
accompanying text for further discussion of shareholders' derivative actions.
13. Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C. App. 77, 87, 250 S.E.2d 279, 286 (1978).
14. Alford v. Shaw, 318 N.C. 289, 294 n.4, 349 S.E.2d 41, 44 n.4 (1986),
rev'd, 320 N.C. 465, 358 S.E.2d 323 (1987). This footnote explains the complex
inter-relationships as follows:
ACFC [American Commonwealth Financial Corporation], a defendant in this
action.... was controlled by defendant ICH [Corporation] which in turn was
controlled by defendants Shaw and Rice. ACFC then sold this stock to
defendant GCL [Great Commonwealth Life Insurance Company], its whollyowned subsidiary. The offices of AAA [All American Assurance Company]
were moved to Dallas, Texas where AAA shares common facilities and
personnel with GCL and other affiliated companies under a cost sharing-plan.
AAA then formed NALICO in 1981. NALICO Insurance Company, a whollyowned subsidiary of AAA, acquired all of the shares of National American
Life Insurance Company (NAL). NAL, a Louisiana company, had been in
both receivership and rehabilitation. NALICO was dissolved in December
1982. NAL is wholly-owned by AAA.
Id.
15. Id. at 293, 349 S.E.2d at 44. In summarizing the specific claims, the
North Carolina Supreme Court stated:
These [claims] included failing to exercise an option to purchase shares of
AAA stock from Great Commonwealth Life Insurance Company (GCL) and
failing to exercise a "put" to sell shares of AAA stock to American Commonwealth Financial Corporation (ACFC); paying excessive amounts to affil-
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forth in a letter dated October 28, 1981, and sent to All American's
board of directors by Attorney Thomas A. Lockhart, counsel for
minority shareholders of All American.' 6 Mr. Lockhart, by letter
dated May 11, 1982, presented a list of demands to the board
pursuant to these allegations. 17 In response to these demands, on
June 10, 1982, the board passed a resolution to appoint Walter F.
Brinkley as special counsel.'" Mr. Brinkley was asked to recommend
two independent and qualified persons for service on the board of
directors as a special litigation committee.' 9 On July 9, 1982, Mr.

iated companies for administrative expenses; entering into certain allegedly
improper reinsurance and coinsurance agreements; redeeming certain 8% debentures held by affiliated companies; releasing American Bank and Trust
Company (ABTC) of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, from an obligation to purchase
an office building; and engaging in other allegedly improper transactions with
affiliates, including unsecured loans and joint ownership of airplanes.
Id.

16. Id. Until its merger with All American of Louisiana, Pyramid Insurance
Company had retained the law firm of Cansler, Lockhart, Parker & Young as
general counsel. This relationship was discontinued by All American after completion
of the merger in 1972. Then, on July 30, 1975, the firm was again retained by All
American for representation in the North Carolina rehabilitation proceedings. 39
N.C. App. at 86, 250 S.E.2d at 286.
On July 16, 1976, Norman Swenson retained Cansler, Lockhart, Parker &
Young to represent him in his suit to enjoin All American from holding its substitute
annual shareholders' meeting on July 21, 1976. Id. at 86-87, 250 S.E.2d at 286. In
Swenson v. All American Assurance Co., the defendants unsuccessfully petitioned

the court to disqualify plaintiffs' counsel for conflict of interest. Swenson v. All
American Assurance Co., 33 N.C. App. 458, 460, 235 S.E.2d 793, 795 (1977). The
firm continued to represent minority shareholders in subsequent related actions. See
39 N.C. App. at 82, 250 S.E.2d at 283; Alford v. Shaw, 72 N.C. App. 537, 538,
324 S.E.2d 878, 880 (1985); 318 N.C. at 290, 349 S.E.2d at 42; 320 N.C. at 466,
358 S.E.2d at 324.
17. 318 N.C. at 294, 349 S.E.2d at 45. Included in the list were demands
that All American refrain from entering into any coinsurance and reinsurance
agreements or transactions with affiliates, without the approval of the North Carolina
Department of Insurance; recover loans and advances made to affiliates; recover
investments, totalling at least $4,259,149, in National American Life Insurance
Company; and recover 232,678 shares of All American's stock from Great Commonwealth Life, which had purchased them for five dollars per share when All
American had a "put" option to sell 51,774 shares to American Commonwealth
Financial Corporation for $10 dollars per share. Id.
18. Id. at 310, 349 S.E.2d at 54. Mr. Brinkley, a member of the American
College of Trial Lawyers and past president of the North Carolina Bar Association,
was experienced as special counsel and in corporation, insurance, and litigation
matters. He had not previously represented All American or any of its affiliates.
Id.

19. Id. Special litigation committees consist of one or more persons appointed
to a corporate board of directors for the purpose of investigating and advising the
full board of the merits of pending or threatened litigation. The committee may or
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Brinkley recommended Marion G. Follin 0 and Frank M. Parker. 21
Both men were elected to All American's board of directors on July
21, 1982.22
On November 4, 1982, the minority shareholders filed a complaint 2
in the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County, North Carolina,
asserting claims on behalf of All American. 24 The complaint alleged
enormous losses to the corporation 25 as a result of fraud, self-dealing,
and mismanagement 26 by the majority of All American's board of
directors. 27 Also occurring in November, 1982, was a series of mergers
by which All American and other companies controlled by defendant
ICH Corporation became wholly-owned subsidiaries of ICH, thereby
2
eliminating the minority shareholders. 1
The special litigation committee conducted an extensive investigation of the complaint in the derivative action 29 as well as related

may not have the power to bind the full board to its recommendations. Persons
appointed to the committee may or may not have been members of the board
previous to occurrance of the acts complained of or the creation of the committee.
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 12, at 619-40. See infra notes 136-40, 233-35, 238-43
and accompanying text for further discussion of special litigation committees.
20. 318 N.C. at 310, 349 S.E.2d at 54. Mr. Follin had forty years experience
in the life insurance business and had been an advisor and trustee with the United
States Bankruptcy Court. Prior to his retirement from the company in 1970, he was
Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors and Senior Vice President of Pilot Life
Insurance Company. Id.
21. Id. Judge Parker had 32 years experience as a practicing attorney, had
been a member of the North Carolina Senate and had been an associate Judge on
the North Carolina Court of Appeals for twelve years. Id.
22. Id. at 310-11, 349 S.E.2d at 54. At the meeting in which he was elected
to the board of All American, Judge Parker, speaking for Mr. Follin as well as
himself, made a statement for the record that he and Mr. Follin were undertaking
these duties with no preconceptions as to the claims against All American's board,
with a commitment to conduct a thorough investigation of these claims, and with
a determination to exercise independent judgment and to vigorously prosecute any
meritorious claims encountered. Id.
23. Id. at 295, 349 S.E.2d at 45.
24. Id. at 291, 349 S.E.2d at 43.
25. Id.
26. Alford v. Shaw, 320 N.C. 465, 467, 358 S.E.2d 323, 325 (1987).
27. Alford v. Shaw, 318 N.C. 289, 291 n.l, 349 S.E.2d 41, 43 n.1 (1986).
28. Id. at 294 n.4, 349 S.E.2d at 44 n.4.
29. Id. at 312, 349 S.E.2d at 55. Describing the scope of the investigation
conducted by the special litigation committee, the North Carolina Supreme Court
noted that "the committee interviewed sixteen people, (footnote omitted) reviewed
approximately 3,750 documents, (footnote omitted) submitted interrogatories to each
person who served as a director of AAA [All American Assurance] during the
relevant period, and prepared a 409 page report in addition to an appendix which
included twenty-five exhibits." Id.
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claims in a class action suit brought in the United States District
Court for the Western District of North Carolina.3 0 The committee
completed its investigation and submitted its report to the board in
July, 1983.31 With regard to the claims asserted in the derivative
action, the committee recommended that two be settled and all others
dismissed.3 2 The defendant board members, in accordance with these
recommendations, approved a settlement agreement covering two of
3
the claims and moved for summary judgment on the others. 1
The trial court, considering the defendant's motions for summary
judgment, first looked to the composition of the special litigation
committee and the investigatory procedures employed by it and found
"no genuine issue of a material fact as to the disinterestedness,
independence and good faith of the Special Committee, or as to the
scope of the investigation or the appropriateness of the procedures
adopted and followed by the Special Committee in investigating the
claims asserted. ' 34 Second, the trial judge invoked the business
judgment rule, 35 and granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment. 36 The plaintiffs appealed, and the North Carolina Court
of Appeals vacated the judgment of the trial court and remanded
37
the case for rehearing.
The single issue on appeal was whether the business judgment rule
was properly applied to the decision of a special litigation committee,
when the committee recommended dismissal of minority shareholders'
derivative claims brought against defendant majority directors of the
corporation. The court of appeals, treating the issue as one of first
impression in North Carolina, prefaced its analysis by asserting a

30. Id. at 291 n.2, 349 S.E.2d at 43 n.2 (the decision of the district court is
unreported).
31. Id. at 313, 349 S.E.2d at 56.
32. Id. at 291, 349 S.E.2d at 43.
33. Id. at 292, 349 S.E.2d at 43.
34. Id. (quoting the trial judge-the opinion of the trial court is unreported).
35. Alford v. Shaw, 72 N.C. App. 537, 538, 324 S.E.2d 878, 880 (1985),
rev'd, 318 N.C. 289, 349 S.E.2d 41 (1986), modified and aff'd on rehearing, 320
N.C. 465, 358 S.E.2d 323 (1987). The business judgment rule generally operates to
preclude judicial inquiry into decisions made by corporate directors and managers,
absent evidence of bias or bad faith. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 12, at 606-08;

Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of
the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 96, 1.01-04 (1980) [hereinafter Dent]. See
infra notes 53, 59-66, 124-35, 160-65, 225-32, 249-58 and accompanying text for
further discussion of the business judgment rule.
36. 72 N.C. App. at 538, 324 S.E.2d at 880.
37. Id. at 549, 324 S.E.2d at 887 (the opinion of the trial court is unreported).
38. Id. at 539, 324 S.E.2d at 881.
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strong public policy favoring derivative actions.3 9 The court then
proceeded to discuss the three principle approaches to this issue taken
by other jurisdictions.4
The approach taken by the Court of Appeals of New York in
Auerbach v. Bennett4' was to incorporate the business judgment rule
into a two-part test. This test limited judicial inquiry to determining
whether the committee was sufficiently disinterested and whether it
utilized adequate investigatory procedures.4 2 The Supreme Court of
Delaware set forth a more stringent two-part analysis in Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado.43 This test not only required judicial evaluation
of the good faith and disinterestedness of the committee, but also
provided for judicial inquiry into the merits of the committee's
decisions." The Supreme Court of Iowa, however, in Miller v.
Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc. ,4 rejected the application of the
business judgment rule to all special litigation committees appointed
by defendant directors because of the potential for structural bias
inherent in all such committees. 46
47
The North Carolina Court of Appeals adopted the Miller rule,
admitting that most jurisdictions which had considered the issue had
adopted either the Auerbach or the Zapata approach. 48 In support
of this decision, the court of appeals argued that the problems are
too complex in nature and the business judgment rule too broad in
scope to permit its effective use as an instrument of judicial review.4 9

39. Id. at 541, 324 S.E.2d at 882. Although shareholders have the right to
sell their shares to avoid the ill-effects of corporate mismanagement, the court
favored the protection of derivative actions as a judicial remedy where the value of
shares has been substantially undermined by the mismanagement of corporate
directors. Id. at 539, 324 S.E.2d at 881.
40. Id. at 541-42, 324 S.E.2d at 882.
41. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). See infra
notes 147-64, 253-54 and accompanying text for further discussion of this case.
42. Id. at 634, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
43. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). See infra notes 165-85, 255-58 and accompanying text for further discussion of this case.
44. Id. at 788-89. It is important to note, however, that the Zapata court
did not mandate the second part of the test, but left it as a matter of judicial
discretion. Id. at 789. See infra note 185 and accompanying text for further discussion
of the discretionary aspect of the second part of the Zapata test.
45. 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983). See infra notes 186-201, 256-58 and
accompanying text for further discussion of this case.
46. Id. at 718. See infra notes 184, 197, 201, 238-243 and accompanying text
for further discussion of structural bias.
47. Alford v. Shaw, 72 N.C. App. 537, 547, 324 S.E.2d 878, 886 (1985).
48. Id. at 546, 324 S.E.2d at 885.
49. Id. at 547, 324 S.E.2d at 886.
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Furthermore, the North Carolina Court of Appeals asserted that the
Miller rule places the burden of proof for summary judgment motions
on the defendant directors rather than on the plaintiff shareholders,
as does the business judgment rule.5 0 The court reasoned that the
burden properly belongs on the defendant directors because of the
high standard of their fiduciary duty and their greater access to
evidence.5 1 Finally, it was briefly noted by the court of appeals that
its review of the cases failed to produce any instances in which a
special litigation committee, under similar circumstances, recom52
mended proceeding with a suit.

By adopting the Miller rule, however, the North Carolina Court
of Appeals was careful to note that it was rejecting the business
judgment rule only as an affirmative defense, and not as traditionally
applied during trial as an evidentiary standard for testing the sufficiency of facts presented by plaintiffs.53 Furthermore, adoption of
the prophylactic Miller rule was not intended to eliminate the use of
summary judgment as a device to terminate meritless claims, or the
use of special litigation committees where the claims are against third4
party outsiders or a minority of a board of directors.1
The Supreme Court of North Carolina granted the defendants'
petition for discretionary review, and on October 7, 1986,11 reversed
the decision of the court of appeals, and remanded for reinstatement
6
of summary judgment by the trial court.1
Chief Justice Billings, writing for the majority of the North Carolina Supreme Court5 7 began her analysis with a detailed discussion
of the historical development of the shareholders' derivative action. 8

50. Id. at 547-48, 324 S.E.2d at 886.
51. Id. See infra notes 69-71, 76, 222 and accompanying text for further
discussion of the burden of proof.
52. Id. at 548, 324 S.E.2d at 886.
53. Id. See infra notes 135, 225-27 and accompanying text for discussion of
the various applications of the business judgment rule.
54. Id.
55. Alford v. Shaw, 318 N.C. 289, 289, 349 S.E.2d 41, 41 (1986).
56. Id. at 314, 349 S.E.2d at 56.
57. Id. at 290, 349 S.E.2d at 42. Chief Justice Billings was joined by Justices
Meyer, Mitchell, Parker (Francis I.), and Browning. Justice Frye concurred in part
and dissented in part. Id. at 314-17, 349 S.E.2d at 56-58. See infra notes 72-73 and
accompanying text for further discussion of Justice Frye's opinion. Justice Martin
also wrote a dissenting opinion. Id. at 318-30, 349 S.E.2d at 58-65. See infra notes
74-77 and accompanying text for further discussion of Justice Martin's dissenting
opinion. See also infra notes 81-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Justice Martin's majority opinion upon the court's rehearing of the case.
58. Id. at 295-300, 349 S.E.2d at 45-48.
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The Chief Justice characterized the business judgment rule as a
natural outgrowth of the derivative suit.5 9 The right of shareholders
to maintain an action against fraudulent or untrustworthy directors
gives rise to and is counterbalanced by the right of directors to
exercise their business judgment, even if erroneous, free from interference.6 Thus, the business judgment rule protects the ability of
good faith business decisions to be made by those best qualified to
61
make them-the officers and directors of the corporation.

Chief Justice Billings then defended the business judgment rule by
employing an economic analysis.6 2 Since litigation can be extremely
63
expensive for a business in terms of indirect as well as direct costs,

the Chief Justice rejected the prophylactic rule of Miller& and reasoned that sound economic policy demands judicial deference to the
business judgment rule.6 5 Therefore, the problem was reduced to
determining the appropriate degree of judicial deference that should
be accorded to the rule. 6
The Zapata approach was rejected by the Chief Justice as providing
only an illusory improvement over the Auerbach rule because it
provided no guidelines for review of the merits of a special litigation
67
committee's decisions.
Finally, turning her attention to the Auerbach approach, the Chief
Justice criticized it for failing to adequately safeguard the ability of
minority shareholders to maintain derivative suits against defendant
majority directors.6 However, Chief Justice Billings determined that
the Auerbach approach would adequately protect minority shareholders in such situations if it were modified so that the burden of
proving the good faith, independence and disinterestedness of the
special litigation committee was shifted from the plaintiff sharehold-

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

298,
299,
299,
302,

349
349
349
349

S.E.2d
S.E.2d
S.E.2d
S.E.2d

at
at
at
at

47.
47.
48.
49.

63. Id. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 12, at 617-18; Block & Prussin, The
Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder DerivativeActons: Viva Zapata?, 37 Bus.
LAW. 27, 29 (1981) [hereinafter Block & Prussin]. See also infra notes 123, 130,

212-14 and accompanying text for further discussion of the costs and other adverse
effects of shareholders' derivative litigation.
64. Alford v. Shaw, 318 N.C. 289, 304, 349 S.E.2d 41, 50 (1986).

65. Id. at 302, 349 S.E.2d at 49.
66. Id. at 303, 349 S.E.2d at 50.
67. Id. at 306-07, 349 S.E.2d at 52. See infra notes 100, 185 and accompanying
text for further discussion of the limits of the Zapata test.
68. Id. at 308, 349 S.E.2d at 53.
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ers to the defendant directors. 69 But, the Chief Justice also held that
when the defendant directors are able to carry this burden, the
actions taken by the committee will be presumed to have been made
in good faith.70 This modified version of the Auerbach test was then
7
adopted by the majority as the controlling rule in North Carolina. '
Justice Frye concurred with the majority's finding that, in this
72
case, the use of a special litigation committee was appropriate.
However, Justice Frye dissented from the adoption of the Auerbach
rule by the majority, claiming that consistency with North Carolina
73
statutory and case law required adoption of the Zapata approach.
Justice Martin, also in dissent,7 4 asserted that the modified Auerbach rule adopted by the majority amounted to an abdication of the
judicial duty to protect the interests of shareholders, as required by
North Carolina statutes. 7 Furthermore, stated Justice Martin, the
benefit which plaintiff shareholders received from shifting the summary judgment burden of proof to the defendant directors was offset
by the creation of a presumption of good faith on the part of a
special litigation committee. 76 Justice Martin found the Miller approach persuasive and advocated the use of court appointed special
77
litigation committees.
On January 6, 1987, the Supreme Court of North Carolina granted
the plaintiff shareholders' request for a rehearing. 78 Then, upon
rehearing, the supreme court withdrew its previous decision, 79 modified and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, and remanded
80
for further proceedings.
Writing now for the majority, Justice Martin8 abandoned the
broad historical and economic perspective which dominated the court's

69. Id. at 307, 349 S.E.2d at 52.
70. Id. at 309, 349 S.E.2d at 53.
71. Id. at 307, 349 S.E.2d at 52.
72. Id. at 314, 349 S.E.2d at 56.
73. Id.
74. See infra notes 81-101 and accompanying text for discussion of Justice
Martin's majority opinion upon the court's rehearing of the case.
75. Id. at 320, 349 S.E.2d at 59.
76. Id. at 321-22, 349 S.E.2d at 60.
77. Id. at 324-25, 349 S.E.2d at 62.
78. Alford v. Shaw, 318 N.C. 703, 351 S.E.2d 738 (1987). Chief Justice
Billings and Justices Parker (Francis I.) and Browning had been replaced by Chief
Justice Exum and Justices Webb and Wichard within the 30-day period in which
motions for rehearing are permitted by North Carolina law.
79. Alford v. Shaw, 320 N.C. 465, 467, 358 S.E.2d 323, 324 (1987).
80. Id. at 474, 358 S.E.2d at 328.
81. Id. at 466, 358 S.E.2d at 324. Justice Martin was joined by Chief Justice
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previous opinion. Instead, Justice Martin chose a narrower approach,
and focused upon the legislative intent and the proper interpretation
of the North Carolina Business Corporation Act 2 as it relates to
shareholders' derivative actions 83
Justice Martin asserted that the North Carolina legislature had
adopted a policy favoring minority shareholders and shareholders'
derivative actions, 4 which was manifest in the Business Corporation
Act, sections 55-55 8" and 55-30(b)(3). 8 6 Section 55-55 authorized

shareholders' derivative actions 7 and set forth rules to govern them. 8
Section 55-55(c) prohibited the termination of shareholders' derivative
actions without court approval. 9 It also provided that when a court
permits termination, it may also require that notice be given to all
parties substantially affected. 90 Therefore, Justice Martin interpreted
the plain language of section 55-55(c) as requiring a judicial inquiry
into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether termination
would have a substantial affect on the interests of any of the parties,
and also concluded that such inquiry would be necessary to determine
whether notice to any of the parties was indicated. 9'
Justice Martin found additional evidence of legislative intent in
section 55-30 of the Business Corporation Act. 92 This section established a "just and reasonable" standard for voiding corporate transactions in which a director has an adverse interest. According to this
standard, a transaction is not voidable or void if the adversely
interested director can prove that the transaction, relative to the
corporation's interests, was "just and reasonable" when entered
into. 93

Exum and Justices Frye and Wichard. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Justice Martin's dissenting opinion upon the court's first hearing
of the case. Justice Mitchell did not participate, and Justices Webb and Meyer
dissented. Id. at 474, 358 S.E.2d at 328-29. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying
text for discussion of the dissenting opinions.
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55 (1955).
83. 320 N.C. at 469-70, 358 S.E.2d at 326.
84.

Id.

85.

N.C.

86.

N.C. GEN.

87. N.C.
88. N.C.
89. N.C.
90.
91.
92.
93.

GEN. STAT.
STAT.
GEN. STAT.
GEN. STAT.
GEN. STAT.

§ 55-55 (1973).
§
§
§
§

55-30(b)(3) (1973).

55-55(a) (1973).
55-55(b) & (c) (1973).
55-55(c) (1973).

Id.
Alford v. Shaw, 320 N.C. 465, 470-71, 358 S.E.2d 323, 326-27 (1987).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-30 (1973); 320 N.C. at 472, 358 S.E.2d at 327.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-30(b)(3) (1973).
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When read in pari materia, according to Justice Martin, sections
55-55 and 55-30(b)(3) indicate a clear legislative intent to place the
burden of proof upon defendant directors accused of self-dealing. 94

Consequently, a court cannot passively accept a recommendation to
terminate shareholder litigation when made by a special litigation
committee appointed by such directors. 95 Rather, the court must

make an independent inquiry into the merits of the recommendation
in order to determine whether the defendant directors, by their special
litigation committee, have met their burden of proof. 96 Summary
judgment in favor of directors accused of self-dealing is permissible
97
only after they have met this burden.
Accordingly, the modified Auerbach rule, 98 which was previously
adopted by the majority, was now held to grant more deference to
the decisions of a special litigation committee than was intended by
the North Carolina Legislature. 99 Therefore, consistent with his interpretation of the North Carolina Business Corporation Act, Justice
Martin announced a broadened version of the Zapata rule.100
As a deterrent to frivolous or bad faith shareholders' derivative
suits, Justice Martin noted that the North Carolina Business Corporation Act permitted courts, in their discretion, to require plaintiff
shareholders to compensate defendants for reasonable litigation expenses, including attorney's fees, for actions brought unreasonably.' 0'
94. 320 N.C. at 473, 358 S.E.2d at 328.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text for further discussion of
this modified version of the Auerbach test.
99. Alford v. Shaw, 320 N.C. 465, 469-70, 358 S.E.2d 323, 326 (1987).
100. Id. at 471-72, 358 S.E.2d at 327. The Zapata approach did not require
judicial inquiry into the merits of a special litigation committee's decision to terminate
shareholder litigation unless the demand requirement was excused. Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981). The demand requirement mandates that
plaintiff shareholders exhaust their intra-corporate remedies, including the presentation of their claims to the board of directors, prior to filing suit. The demand
requirement is generally excused when the majority directors are accused of wrongdoing (i.e., when demand would be futile). Id. at 784. However, Justice Martin
held that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-55(c) (1973) mandates judicial inquiry regardless of
whether demand is excused. 320 N.C. at 472, 358 S.E.2d at 327. See supra note 67
and infra note 185 and accompanying text for further discussion of the Zapata twopart test, and infra notes 119, 127, 220 and accompanying text for further discussion
of the demand requirement.
101. Alford v. Shaw, 320 N.C. 465, 470 n.1, 358 S.E.2d 323, 326 n.1 (1987).
The specific statute to which the note refers is N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-55(e) (1973).
Id. See infra notes 122, 221 and accompanying text for further discussion of frivolous
or bad faith shareholders' derivative suits.
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Justice Webb, while in substantive agreement with the majority,
had voted against reconsideration and dissented on the basis that it
was a mistake to modify such a recent decision, in which all matters
had been considered. 0 2 Justice Meyer dissented and asserted the
correctness of the previous decision of the court. 103
The shareholders' derivative suit originated in the common law of
England.' ° An early articulation of the common law action appeared
in an 1843 English case, Foss v. Harbottle.015 These actions began
appearing in the United States at about the same time, but initially
were not clearly defined as derivative in nature.' °0
Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co., 1" was a seminal American shareholders' derivative action. 08 In Taylor, a shareholder sought to hold
bank directors liable for fraudulent activities that resulted in depreciating stock values, withholding dividends, suspension of operations,
and monetary losses to the corporatio ..c 1 9 However, rather than grant
standing to the plaintiff as a derivative right of shareholders, the
court addressed the action on the basis that the relationship between
directors and shareholders was analogous to a trust." 0 Other early
American decisions followed this trust analogy in deciding shareholder actions."'
The types of claims which could be pursued in these early actions
were also limited." 2 In Dodge v. Woolsey," 3 a shareholder sought to
prevent the corporation from paying an allegedly unconstitutional
state tax. 114 Although the Dodge decision clearly recognized the right
of even a single shareholder to sue on behalf of the corporation in

102. Id. at 474, 358 S.E.2d at,328.
103. Id. at 474, 358 S.E.2d at 329.
104. See, e.g., Prunty, supra note 12, at 980-85. See also supra note 12 and
infra notes 105-24, 202-18, 236-37 and accompanying text for further discussion of
shareholders' derivative actions.
105.
2 Hare 461, 67 Enig. Rep. 1,89 (1843). See also, Wedderburn, The Rule
in Foss v. Harbottle, (pts. 1 & 2), 1957 CAmBRiDGE L.J. 194, 1958 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
93.
106. See, e.g., Prunty, supra note 12, at 985-91.
107. 5 Ohio 99 (1831).
108. Prunty, supra note 12, at 988.
109. 5 Ohio at 99-100.
110. Id. at 103.
111. Prunty, supra note 12, at 986-89. The most notable case which applied
the trust analogy to early American shareholder litigation was Robinson v. Smith,
3 Paige Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1832). Prunty, supra note 12, at 986.
112. Prunty, supra note 12, at 991-92.
113. 59 U.S.(18 How.) 331 (1855).
114. Id. at 339.
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cases involving a breach of trust by corporate directors, this right
was held not to include cases involving only error, bad judgment or
negligence on the part of the directors." 5 In 1882, shareholders'
derivative actions, as such, were recognized by the Supreme Court
of the United States in Hawes v. Oakland."6 In Hawes, a shareholder
of a private water supply company sought to prevent the City of
Oakland, California, from continuing to receive free, non-emergency
water service." 7 The Court recognized a limited right of shareholders
to sue derivatively on behalf of the corporation where a breach of
trust was not alleged," l8 but held that Hawes lacked standing as a
result of his failure to make a demand upon the directors prior to
instituting the suit. 1 9 This requirement was considered necessary to
permit the corporation to retain control of the litigation, 20 a right
that the Court held belongs first to the corporation, and only
2
secondarily to the shareholders.' '
With the development and expansion of the right of shareholders'
to bring derivative actions, there came a growing concern for limiting
the right so as to preclude frivolous or bad faith actions. 22 Furthermore, it was recognized that some meritorious actions, instituted by
shareholders in good faith, could be contrary to overall corporate
interests. 123 These concerns gave rise to the doctrine known generally
as the business judgment rule.'2'
115. Id. at 343-44.
116. 104 U.S. 450, 453 (1882).
117. Id. at 451.
118. Id. at 460. However, the expanded right was limited by the Court to
instances where directors are alleged to have engaged in illegal, fraudulent, or selfdealing activities; activities outside the scope of their authority; and other nonspecified activities only if necessary to prevent irreparable harm to the corporation.
Id.
119. Id. at 460-61. A shareholders' derivative suit is an action in equity,
available only in the absence of any other adequate remedy. Therefore, directors
must be given the opportunity to refuse to pursue a claim, after a demand by
shareholders for them to do so, before the shareholders themselves acquire the right
to pursue the claim on behalf of the corporation. Id. See supra notes 12, 104-18
and infra notes 120-24, 236-37 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
nature of shareholders' derivative suits. See supra note 100 and infra notes 127, 220
and accompanying text for further discussion of the demand requirement.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 35, at 137-40.
123. Id. See supra note 63 and infra notes 130, 212-14 and accompanying text
for further discussion of the costs of shareholders' derivative actions, and other
reasons for their early termination.
124. Id. at 100-01. See supra notes 35, 53, 59-66 and infra notes 125-35, 16065, 225-32, 249-58 and accompanying text for further discussion of the business
judgment rule.
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The leading statement of the business judgment rule was made by
the Supreme Court in United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated
Copper Co. 25 This case clearly established the basic elements of the
ongoing controversy involving the application of the business judgment rule in shareholders' derivative actions. In describing the application and limitations of the rule within this context, the Court
stated:
Whether or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the courts a
cause of action for damages is, like other business questions, ordinarily
a matter of internal management and is left to the discretion of the
directors, in the absence of instruction by vote of the stockholders.
Courts interfere seldom to control such discretion intra vires the
corporation, except where the directors are guilty of misconduct equivalent to a breach of trust, or where they stand in a dual relation which
prevents an unprejudiced exercise of judgment.... 126
The Court then reaffirmed the demand requirement, except in cases
where the shareholders had no opportunity to present their demands
to the board of directors, where delay would threaten successful
pursuit of the action or where a majority of the directors are accused
of wrongdoing.127
The possibility of shareholders' derivative actions has been generally acknowledged to provide a deterrent to misconduct by corporate
directors.'2 Consequently, shareholders' litigation was usually not
terminable by directors where the action sought enforcement of a
legal duty owed by the board or where the action involved claims of
fraud or self-dealing by the directors.129 However, even when the
claims are meritorious, there can be powerful reasons for an early
termination of the action. These reasons include the cost of carrying
on the litigation, disruption to the business, diversion of management's time and attention, and bad publicity for the corporation. 3 0
In these situations, the business judgment rule was often invoked by

125. 244 U.S. 261 (1917).
126. Id. at 263-64.
127. Id. at 264. See supra notes 100, 119 and infra note 220 and accompanying
text for further discussion of the demand requirement.
128. See, e.g., Block & Prussin, supra note 63, at 30-31; Coffee & Schwartz,
The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and Proposalfor Legislative
Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 261, 302-09 (1981) [hereinafter Coffee & Schwartz].
129. Block & Prussin, supra note 63, at 39.
130. Id. at 29. In summary, Block and Prussin state that "although some
derivative suits do provide valuable benefits to the corporation, more often they are
losing propositions." Id. at 30. See also Brown, supra note 12, at 617-19.
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directors to effect early termination.' The rule thus provided directors with necessary business discretion without fear of interference
13 2
by the courts.
The business judgment rule has traditionally operated as a presumption of good faith and due care as to the actions taken by
corporate directors.'33 It was used to defend the merits of decisions
made by corporate directors. 3 4 But a more recent development has
been the application of the business judgment rule to justify the
power of directors to terminate shareholder litigation.'35
The use of a special litigation committee is one method by which
directors apply the business judgment rule to terminate shareholders'
derivative litigation. 3 6 Gall v. Exxon Corp.3 7 was the first shareholders' derivative action involving the use of a special litigation
committee. 3 s In Gall, a shareholder claimed damages on behalf of
the corporation for waste, mismanagement and misrepresentation by
directors for activities involving the payment of fifty-nine million
dollars in bribes to foreign officials. 3 9 The Gall court affirmed the
power of a disinterested committee to terminate shareholder litigation
when the committee acted with due care."40
In Burks v. Lasker, ' 4 ' mutual fund shareholders charged directors
with violations of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 142 the
Investors Advisors Act of 1940 "43 and failure to exercise due care
when they made purchases of twenty million dollars in Penn Central
commercial paper shortly before that company became insolvent.' 44
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals,

131. Block & Prussin, supra note 63, at 38.
132. Id. at 32-33.
133. Id. at 33.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 38. This application of the rule is termed "offensive," id., as
opposed to its traditional "defensive" application: Id. at 31.
136. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 35, at 105.
137. 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
138. Block & Prussin, supra note 63, at 38.
139. 418 F. Supp. at 509.
140. Id. at 516-17. However, the court did deny the defendant's motion for
summary judgment in order to allow the plaintiff to engage in discovery adequate
to determine whether or not the committee acted with due care. Id. at 520.
141. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a)(3) (1964). 441 U.S. at 473 n.1.

143.
144.

15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1964). 441 U.S. at 473 n.2.
441 U.S. at 473-74. The petitioners claimed the directors breached their

fiduciary duty when, without any independent investigation, they relied upon the
recommendation of an investment firm to make the purchase. Id. at 474 n.3.
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which had denied the power of the defendant majority directors to
terminate the litigation. 4 The Court affirmed that disinterested directors may terminate shareholder litigation when permitted by applicable state law, providing the state law is not inconsistent with
federal law.'4
The first use by a highest state court of the business judgment
rule to validate the decision of a special litigation committee not to
pursue shareholder derivative claims occurred in Auerbach v. Bennett.1 47 In Auerbach, shareholders brought a derivative action on
behalf of General Telephone and Electronics Corporation seeking an
accounting by defendant directors for alleged payment of bribes and
kickbacks to foreign public officials and political parties. 4 The board
established a special litigation committee of three directors who had
joined the board subsequent to the alleged activities. 149 Vested with
the full power of the board with respect to matters relating to the
litigation, 150 the committee determined that the defendant directors
had not violated the standard of care established by state law and
had not personally profited from the transactions.' Furthermore,
the committee determined that pursuit of the litigation was not in
the best interest of the corporation because the claims were meritless. 5 2 The committee sought dismissal of the suit,'53 which was
granted by the trial court on the basis of the business judgment
rule. 5 4 An appeal was taken, 5 ' and the appellate division reversed
on the basis that the business judgment rule could not operate to
allow summary judgment prior to discovery. 5 6 The New York Court

145. Id. at 475.
146. Id. at 486. In other words, federal law incorporates rather than displaces
state law in this area. Id. at 478-79.
147. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). See supra
note 41 and infra notes 253-54 and accompanying text for further discussion of this
case.
148. Id. at 624-25, 393 N.E.2d at 996-97, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 922-23.
149. Id. at 625, 393 N.E.2d at 997, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 923.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 625-26, 393 N.E.2d at 997, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 923.
153. Id. at 625-26, 393 N.E.2d at 997, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 923-24.
154. Id. at 630, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
155. Id. at 626-27, 393 N.E.2d at 998, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 924. The initial claim
in this action was made by shareholder Auerbach. When the trial court granted the
motion for dismissal, and Auerbach showed no intention of appealing, Stanley
Wallenstein, as executor of the estate of Ida S. Wallenstein, successfully intervened
and filed the appeal. Id.
156. Id. at 636, 393 N.E.2d at 1003-04, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
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of Appeals affirmed the application of the business judgment rule
to permit summary judgment prior to substantive discovery so as to
157
preclude "fishing expeditions."
Judge Jones, writing for the majority in Auerbach,15 s began the
opinion by asserting the power of directors to terminate shareholder
litigation through the use of a special litigation committee. 159 This
assertion was defended by invoking the business judgment rule and
reasoning:
Derivative claims against corporate directors belong to the corporation itself. As with other questions of corporate policy and management, the decision whether and to what extent to explore and prosecute
such claims lies within the judgment and control of the corporation's
board of directors. Necessarily such decision must be predicated on
the weighing and balancing of a variety of disparate considerations to
reach a considered conclusion as to what course of action or inaction
is best calculated to protect and advance the interests of the corporation. This is the essence of the responsibility and role of the board
of directors, and courts may not intrude to interfere. 160
In defending the business judgment rule itself, Judge Jones claimed
that directors are specially qualified to render business judgments,
while courts are ill-equipped to do So.161 Furthermore, the responsibility of rendering business judgments was held to be a non-delegable
fiduciary duty of a board of directors. 62 It was admitted, however,
that "the [business judgment] rule shields the deliberations and
conclusions of the chosen representatives of the board only if they
possess a disinterested independence and do not stand in a dual
relation which prevents an unprejudicial exercise of judgment. "163
And, although judicial inquiry is permitted "as to the adequacy and
appropriateness of the committee's investigative procedures and methodologies, it may not under the guise of consideration of such factors
trespass in the domain of business judgment." '

157. Id. at 636, 393 N.E.2d at 1003-04, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
158. Judge Jones was joined by Judges Jasen, Wachtler, Fuchsberg and Meyer.
Id. at 638, 393 N.E.2d at 1005, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 931. Judge Gabrielli took no part
in the decision. Id. Chief Judge Cooke dissented on the basis that he would affirm
the decision of the appellate division. Id. at 636, 393 N.E.2d at 1004, 419 N.Y.S.2d
at 930.
159. Id. at 623-24, 393 N.E.2d at 996, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
160. Id. at 631, 393 N.E.2d at 1000-01, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
161. Id. at 630, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
162. Id. at 633, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
163. Id. at 631, 393 N.E.2d at 1001, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
164. Id. at 634, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
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The Supreme Court of Delaware took a more restrictive view of
the proper application of the business judgment rule in Zapata Corp.
v. Maldonado.165 In Zapata, the Delaware Supreme Court attempted
to resolve conflicting interpretations of Delaware law arising out of
related actions in a lower state court and a federal district court.'6
Shareholder Maldonado had originally brought a derivative action in
the Delaware Court of Chancery in June, 1975, alleging breaches of
fiduciary duty by ten officers and directors of the Zapata Corporation. 167 No prior demand that the board of directors pursue the claim
had been made because, at that time, all of the directors were named
as defendants.' 6 Two years later, Maldonado brought a similar,
related action against the same directors in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York. 169
In 1979, the Zapata Corporation Board of Directors appointed
two new directors to serve as a special litigation committee to
investigate the pending claims of Maldonado as well as those in a
similar action pending in a Texas district court. 70 The committee
was given authority to make a final determination regarding the
litigation, which was to be binding upon the corporation. 71 At the
conclusion of its investigation, in September, 1979, the committee
recommended that these actions be terminated as contrary to the best
interest of the corporation.

72

The district court in Maldonado I granted summary judgment for
the defendant directors 73 on the basis of the committee's recommendation and the business judgment rule. 74 In Maldonado II, however,
the Delaware chancery court rejected the decision of Maldonado I
and held the business judgment rule to be defensive in nature,
operating as a standard of review rather than an authority to confer

165.

430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981). See supra note 43 and infra notes 255-58

and accompanying text for further discussion of this case.
166. Id. at 780.
167.

Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980) [hereinafter Mal-

donado I], see infra note 169.
168. Id.
169.

Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) [hereinafter

Maldonado 1] (although this action began later, this decision was handed down
earlier than the decision in Maldonado II, supra note 167).
170. Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 781. See also, Maher v. Zapata Corp.,
490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980).

171. 430 A.2d at 781.
172. Id.
173.

485 F. Supp. at 287.

174.

Id. at 286.
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decision making powers upon directors. 175 The Delaware chancery
court stated:
The stockholder's right to litigate is secondary to the corporate right
to bring suit only for so long as the corporation has not decided to
refuse to bring suit. Once the corporation refuses, or impliedly refuses,
to assert an apparently valid claim, involving a breach of fiduciary
duty by the corporate directors, the stockholder is vested with a
primary and independent
right to redress the wrong by bringing the
76
derivative suit. 1

Consequently, the chancery court denied the motion of the defendant
directors for dismissal or summary judgment. 77
In Zapata,178 the
Delaware Supreme Court attempted to resolve the conflicting reasoning of the Maldonado I '79 and Maldonado H 180 decisions 8 ' by
balancing the interest of the shareholders in maintaining meritorious
litigation with that of directors in terminating litigation not in the
best interest of the corporation.'8 2 While affirming, in general, the
power of defendant majority directors to delegate authority to pursue
or terminate shareholder litigation,'8 3 the court questioned whether
judicial inquiry merely as to a special litigation committee's independence, good faith and diligence provided an adequate guard
against abuse, especially "subconscious abuse."'' 1 In order to protect
the legitimate interests and concerns of the parties, a two-part test
was adopted and set forth as follows:
First, the Court should inquire into the independence and good faith
of the committee and the bases supporting its conclusions. Limited
discovery may be ordered to facilitate such inquiries. (footnote omitted). The corporation should have the burden of proving independence,
good faith and a reasonable investigation, rather than presuming
independence, good faith and reasonableness. (footnote omitted)....
The second step provides, we believe, the essential key in striking

175. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1256 (Del. Ch. 1980).
176. Id. at 1263.
177. Id. at 1262.
178. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
179. Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See supra notes
169, 173-74 and accompanying text for further discussion of this case.
180. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980). See supra notes.
167-68, 175-77 and accompanying text for further discussion of this case.
181. 430 A.2d at 781.
182. Id. at 784-85.
183. Id. at 786.
184. Id. at 787. See infra notes 197, 201, 238-243 and accompanying text for
further discussion of "subconscious abuse" or structural bias.
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the balance between legitimate corporate claims as expressed in a
derivative stockholder suit and a corporation's best interests as expressed by an independent investigating committee. The Court should
determine, applying its own independent business judgment, whether
the motion should be granted.'85
The Iowa Supreme Court, in Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndi87
cate, Inc. ,86 rejected the approaches taken by both the Auerbach
and Zapata'88 courts. 8 9 Miller involved a derivative action brought
by a minority shareholder alleging self-dealing by the entire fourmember board of directors. 9° After the action had commenced, the
four defendant directors expanded the board to six directors and
filled the two new positions with outsiders.19' The defendant directors
then created a special litigation committee consisting of the two new
directors, 92 which was empowered to investigate the pending derivative claims and make a good faith determination as to whether the

185. Id. at 788-89. Explaining further, the Delaware Supreme Court stated:
"The second step is intended to thwart instances where corporate actions meet the
criteria of step one, but the result does not appear to satisfy its spirit, or where
corporate actions would simply prematurely terminate a stockholder grievance deserving of further consideration in the corporation's interest." Id. Further, the
second step is applicable only to those cases in which the demand requirement is
excused, otherwise the business judgment rule applies. Id. See supra notes 67, 100
and accompanying text for further discussion of the second part of the Zapata test.
186. 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983). This case was heard en banc, to consider
a certified question from the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Iowa. The district court sought a determination of Iowa law as to whether
defendant majority directors have the power to delegate to a special litigation
committee the authority to bind the corporation relative to shareholders' derivative
litigation. Id. at 710. See infra note 201 and accompanying text for discussion of
the court's interpretation of the certified question. Justice Carter wrote for the
majority. Id. Justice Uhlenhopp, joined by Justice Harris, concurred specially.
Justice Uhlenhopp noted that, in addition to the reasoning of the majority opinion,
§ 7.03(c)(iii) of the Restatement and Recommendations on Corporate Governance
appplied to this case, and precluded the use of a special litigation committee by the
defendant board. Id. at 718-19. Justice Wolle dissented, arguing for adoption of a
Zapata-like approach. Id. at 719-20. Justices Reynoldson and McCormick did not
participate in the decision. Id. at 718. See supra note 45 and infra notes 256-58 and
accompanying text for further discussion of this case.
187. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1979). See supra notes 41, 147-64 and infra note 253 and accompanying text for
further discussion of this case.
188. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). See supra notes
43, 165-85 and infra note 255-58 and accompanying text for further discussion of
this case.
189. 336 N.W.2d at 718.
190. Id. at 710.
191. Id.
192. Id.at 710-11.
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litigation should be pursued by the corporation. 193 The decision of
the committee was not to be subject to review by the board and was
to be binding upon the corporation. 94
In Miller, the Iowa Supreme Court announced the third major
approach to evaluating the authority and function of special litigation
committees. 95 This court held that defendant majority directors lack
the authority to delegate the power to terminate shareholders' derivative litigations. 19 The court's reasoning for adopting this prophylactic rule was based upon the structural bias theory, "which suggests
that it is unrealistic to assume that the members of independent
committees are free from personal, financial, or moral influences
which flow from the directors who appoint them."' 9 Citing a line
of precedent originating in United Copper Securities,'"8 the Iowa
Supreme Court concluded, but for the device of the special litigation
committee, a board of directors could not terminate litigation if the
majority were accused of self-dealing1 99 And, since the full board in
such a situation could not terminate the litigation, the court questioned whether the power to terminate could be delegated by the
board to a special litigation committee. 200 In deciding the matter,
however, the court merely held that defendant directors should be
precluded from delegating the power to terminate shareholders' derivative suits to a special litigation committee because the potential
for structural bias is so great and so difficult to prove. 20

193. Id. at 711.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 718.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 716. See generally Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom:
Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 83 (1985); Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in
Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALl Project, 1982 DuKE
L.J. 959, for an extensive analysis of the structural bias theory. See supra note 184
and infra notes 201, 238-243 and accompanying text for further discussion of
structural bias.
198. United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261
(1917).
199. Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 715-16
(Iowa 1983).
200. Id. at 716.
201. Id. at 718. The court interpreted the certified question broadly and
rejected any distinction, in this case, between the authority of a defendant board
to delegate the power to terminate litigation, and the ability of a committee appointed
by defendant directors to exercise this power in an unbiased manner. Id. at 716.
See supra notes 184, 197 and infra notes 238-243 and accompanying text for further
discussion of structural bias.
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An analysis of the proper use of the business judgment rule in
shareholders' derivative actions requires an inquiry into the nature
and rationales of each. Both embrace or are influenced by significant
public policy considerations.II 20

2

These may be described generally as

society's need for corporate effectiveness and its need for public
confidence in corporate management. 2 3 Although these considerations may seem compatible, if not nearly identical, they are often
placed in opposition within the context of shareholders' derivative
litigation. 204 Consequently, the application of the business judgment
rule in these actions creates a need to balance conflicting policies so
as to provide the maximum benefit to all parties, including (and
perhaps especially) the public. 20 5 Shareholders' derivative suits have
a dual nature. They are actually a combination of two distinct but
interrelated causes of action. 2° First, shareholders have an equitable
right to compel the corporation to sue, or to bring suit in its behalf.2 °7
Second, the corporation itself possesses an underlying right to com208
mence and maintain the action.
Shareholders' derivative actions also have two principal rationales,
deterrence and compensation. 2°9 The ability of shareholders to sue
derivatively on behalf of a corporation functions as a deterrent to
misconduct and breach of duty by its directors and officers. 210 And,
successful pursuit of a corporation's underlying claim can result in
211
the corporation receiving compensation for the claimed losses.
21 2
However, since the cost of pursuing this type of litigation
often
greatly exceeds the potential compensation, the compensatory rationale is often more illusory than real. 213 The weakness of this rationale
is underscored by the fact that shareholders who successfully pursue

202. See, e.g., Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 128, at 263; Dent, supra note
35, at 135-36; Elfin, An Evaluation of a New Trend in Corporate Law: Dismissal
of Derivative Suits by Minority Board Committees, 20 AM. Bus. L.J. 179, 198-99

(1982) [hereinafter Elfin].
203. See, e.g., Elfin, supra note 202, at 198-99.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 12, at 603.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 128, at 302-09.
210.
211.

Id.
Id.

212. Id. See supra notes 63, 123, 130, and accompanying text for further
discussion of the costs of shareholder litigation.
213.

Id.
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derivative litigation stand to gain only indirectly, in the degree to
which a recovery of damages produces an increase in corporate assests
and owner's equity, which in turn results in higher dividends and
stock values.

21 4

It can be said that those having the greatest interest in many
shareholders' derivative actions are plaintiffs' counsel. 215 At times,
unscrupulous attorneys have been able to extort settlements for
frivolous or even bad faith claims because it is less costly for a
corporation to settle than to litigate. 21 6 By harming the corporation,
these so-called "strike suits" also harm the shareholders. 217 In these
situations the corporation suffers a double loss, that which results
from the claimed misconduct or breach of duty, as well as the cost
of litigation or settlement.

218

Various procedural barriers have been proposed or established to
block nuisance and bad faith shareholders' derivative actions. 21 9 The
demand requirement is one such barrier. 220 Another is a requirement
that plaintiff shareholders post a security to cover litigation costs if
the action is later deemed frivolous or unwarranted. 22' The burden
of proof can also be allocated so as to make it more or less difficult
for shareholders to maintain an action. 222 In addition, discovery can
be restricted as a means of limiting or precluding shareholder liti22
gation.
Procedural barriers alone, however, often prove unsatisfactory for
terminating shareholder litigation which is meritorious, but not in
the best interest of the corporation to pursue. 224 In this situation, the
business judgment rule has been a favored device for effecting an

Id.
Id. at 318.
216. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 35, at 137.
217. Id. Settlements can sometimes benefit plaintiff shareholders more than
obtaining a judgment if the settlement exceeds the shareholders' cost of litigation.
Id.
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 128, at 309; Brown, supra note
12, at 604, 610-16; Dent, supra note 35, at 97.
220. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 12, at 604; Dent, supra note 35, at 99. See
also supra notes 119, 127 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
demand requirement.
221. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 12, at 605.
222. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 35, at 133-34. See supra notes 50-51, 69-71,
76 and accompanying text for further discussion of the burden of proof.
223. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 35, at 131-33. See supra notes 156-57 and
accompanying text for further discussion of restrictions on discovery.
224. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 12, at 616.
214.

.215.
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early termination of the action. 225 But, except where the plaintiff
shareholders are able to demonstrate self-interest or bad faith by
those seeking termination, unrestricted application of the business
judgment rule can effectively block all shareholder derivative litigation. 226 Consequently, procedural barriers are often imposed in conjunction with the business judgment rule in order to limit its

application

227

In spite of its potential for overbroad application, the business
judgment rule is supported by significant public policy considerations. 22 First is the desire to have directors function as managers
rather than insurers of the corporation. 229 Second is the desire to
have corporations controlled by directors elected by shareholders
rather than by the judiciary or other outsiders. 2 0 Third is the desire
to encourage corporate directors to take reasonable risks, since
231
entrepreneurial risk-taking is the very essence of business activity.
Fourth is the desire to avoid the expense to the public of unnecessary
23 2
judicial involvement in business affairs.
The special litigation committee is a device which, at least ideally,
imposes the least restriction on the use of the business judgment rule
while attempting to maintain an adequate safeguard against overbroad application. 233 The extent to which the device actually provides
this safeguard varies significantly in different situations and is obviously a matter of considerable controversy. 23 4 However, there is a
predictable relation between certain types of shareholder actions and
the extent to which use of the special litigation committee device can
235
prevent overbroad application of the business judgment rule.
Shareholders' derivative actions can be classified in terms of types
of defendants. The possibilities include majority directors, minority
directors, and third parties .236 These actions can also be classified in
terms of the type of wrong alleged. First, the wrongs may or may

225.
226.

Id. at 614-16.
See, e.g., Dent, supra note 35, at 109-110.

227.
228.

See, e.g., Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 128, at 309.
Id. at 280-84; Dent, supra note 35, at 135.

229. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 35, at 135.
230. Id.
231.

See, e.g., Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 128, at 281.

232.

See, e.g., Dent, supra note 35, at 135.

233.

See, e.g., Brown, supra note 12, at 619-21.

234.
235.
236.

Id.
See generally Elfin, supra note 202, at 181-82.
Id.
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not have benefitted the defendants. Second, they may have resulted
in a benefit, no benefit, or harm to the corporation. 2 7
Special
litigation committees should be considered as a special category when
they are appointed by defendant majority directors accused of selfdealing to the detriment of the corporation. This "special category"

has the greatest potential for structural bias, and is the most difficult

23
to evaluate in terms of good faith, diligence and disinterestedness.
The Auerbach test, 23 9 the Zapata test,m or any of their variations24 1
may be appropriately applied to the recommendations of other types
of committees. 242 However, a prophylactic rule should apply to this
"special category" because the structural bias presumption is strong
enough to cast suspicion on the recommendations of even the most
disinterested committee, working in good faith and with the greatest
possible diligence.243
The denial of any positive presumptive weight to the recommendations of "special category" committees is consistent with the
historical development of the shareholders' derivative action. The
equitable origins of the action permitted shareholders to institute and
maintain these actions only in extraordinary circumstances involving
a breach of trust. 2" Taylor245 and other early American shareholders'

237. Id. at 194-95.
238. Id. at 202; Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 128, at 322; Dent, supra note
35, at 110, 122. See supra notes 184, 197, 201 and accompanying text for further
discussion of structural bias.
239. See supra notes 41-42, 68, 164 and accompanying text for further discussion of the Auerbach test.
240. See supra notes 43-44, 67, 185 and accompanying text for further discussion of the Zapata test.
241. See supra notes 69-71, 75, 100 and accompanying text for a further
discussion of variations of the Auerbach and Zapata tests which were set forth by
North Carolina courts.
242. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 35, at 122-23.
243. Id. at 122; Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 128, at 323; Elfin, supra note
202, at 199. But see Ricci, The Perils of Caesar'sWife: Special Litigation Committees
v. The Judiciary; Is Anyone Above Reproach?, 22 WAKE FoRst L. REv. 57 (1987).
According to Professor Ricci, if corporate directors were "judicially sensitized" they
would be better able to avoid actual and apparent bias when serving as members
of a special litigation committee. Id. at 75. In cases involving "special category"
special litigation committees, however, it seems unlikely that adoption of a judicial
model of conduct separated from the long-standing traditions and enforcement
mechanisms of the judicial system would be sufficient to establish the committee's
immunity to structural bias. The Alford opinions demonstrate that structural bias
remains a significant issue even when the good faith, disinterestedness and diligence
of the special litigation committe was not disputed by the plaintiffs except in terms
of structural bias. Alford v. Shaw, 318 N.C. 289, 310, 349 S.E.2d 41, 54 (1986).
244. See, e.g., Prunty, supra note 12, at 980-85.
245. Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co., 5 Ohio 99 (1831).
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derivative actions based the right to bring suit solely upon a breach
of trust between the directors and shareholders.2 The Dodge2 47 Court
foreshadowed the application of the business judgment rule in shareholders' derivative litigation when it distinguished cases involving a
breach of trust from those which merely alleged error, bad judgment
24
or negligence by directors. 1

The Hawes,249 United Copper Securities,250 Gall,25 r Burks,25 2 and
Auerbach2 1 cases indicate that the greatest expansion of the applicability of the business judgment rule to shareholders' derivative
actions has occurred in cases where the defendants were either
minority directors, or third parties, or did not personally benefit
from the alleged misconduct. 25 4 In contrast, those cases that involved
self-dealing by majority directors, such as Zapata,255 Miller,25 6 and
Alford2" have indicated a need to limit the application of the business
2
judgment rule. 1

246. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text for further discussion of
Taylor, and other early American shareholders' derivative actions.
247. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855).
248. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text for further discussion of
this case.
249. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882). See supra notes 116-21 and
accompanying text for further discussion of this case.
250. United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261
(1917). See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text for further discussion of this
case.
251. Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See supra notes
137-40 and accompanying text for further discussion of this case.
252. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). See supra notes 141-46 and
accompanying text for further discussion of this case.
253. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1979). See supra notes 41-42, 147-64 and accompanying text for further discussion
of this case.
254. These cases all involve allegations of harm to the corporation, but not
self-dealing by the defendant directors. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 453 (1882);
United Copper Securities, 244 U.S. at 262-63; Gall, 418 F. Supp. at 509; Burks,
441 U.S. at 471; Auerbach, 47 N.Y.2d at 624-25, 393 N.E.2d at 996-97, 419
N.Y.S.2d at 922-23. See supra notes 116-21 (Hawes), 125-27 (United Copper Securities), 137-40 (Gall), 141-46 (Burks), 41-42, 147-64 (Auerbach) and accompanying
text for further discussion of these cases.
255. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). See supra notes
43-44, 165-85 and accompanying text for further discussion of this case.
256. Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc.,336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983).
See supra notes 45-46, 186-201 and accompanying text for further discussion of this
case.
257. Alford v. Shaw, 320 N.C. 465, 358 S.E.2d 323 (1987). See supra notes
1-103 and accompanying text for further discussion of this case.
258. Zapata involved allegations of self-dealing to the detriment of the cor-
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In Alford, North Carolina courts sought to develop a rule which
would not only balance opposing public policy considerations, but
would also be generally applicable to all types of shareholders'
derivative actions. 5 9 This action, however, involved an extreme example of those factors which constitute a special litigation committee
of the "special category." 260 Therefore, if any case called for adoption
26 1
of the prophylactic approach, surely it was Alford v. Shaw.
Samuel R. Zuck

poration by the entire ten-member board of directors. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413
A.2d 1251, 1255 (Del. Ch. 1980). See supra notes 43-44, 165-85, 255 and accompanying text for further discussion of this case. Miller involved allegations of selfdealing to the detriment of the corporation by the entire four-member board of
directors. 336 N.W.2d at 710. See supra notes 45-46, 186-201, 256 and accompanying
text for further discussion of ths case. Alford involved allegations of self-dealing to
the detriment of the corporation by majority directors. 320 N.C. at 467, 358 S.E.2d
at 325. See supra notes 1-15, 23-27 and accompanying text for further discussion
of these allegations.
259. 320 N.C. at 470-71, 358 S.E.2d at 326-27.
260. Id. at 467, 358 S.E.2d at 325. See supra notes 238-43 and accompanying
text for further discussion of "special category" special litigation committees.
261. 320 N.C. 465, 358 S.E.2d 323.

